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Abstract 
This paper (a) provides a framework for quantifying any economy’s 
flexibility, and (b) reviews the evidence on New Zealand firms’ birth, growth and 
death.  The data indicate that, by and large, the labour market and the financial 
market are doing their job. 
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Creative destruction “revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within,” Joseph Schumpeter famously said, “incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter, 1975, p. 83).  Innovation in 
business—bringing new goods, new markets, new methods of production, new 
ways of organizing firms—is the “fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the 
capitalist engine in motion.”  Does the economy have enough flexibility?  Are 
there barriers in the way of entrepreneurship?  This paper develops a framework 
for quantifying creative destruction. 
Applying the framework to New Zealand, I conclude that the sluggish 
productivity growth of the past fifteen years cannot be blamed on economic 
rigidities.  The data depict an economy with ample creative destruction.   
Ascribing New Zealand’s slow growth to a business-unfriendly culture is a 
misdiagnosis.  
1  The Microeconomics of Productivity 
Growth 
Productivity in New Zealand grew slowly during the 1990s.  Low 
investment was the source of the problem, according to the Treasury (2004), as 
the capital-labour ratio grew less than in comparable countries.  Productivity 
growth appears to have picked up in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with Buckle 
et al. (2004) estimating output per hour of work estimated to be growing at 1.7 
percent per year compared with the previous decade’s 1 percent (see also Black et 
al. (2003), Razzak (2003)).  Nevertheless, concerns continue to be aired about 
New Zealand’s slippage in the world per-capita income ranks—from 3rd highest 
in the world in 1953 to 22nd in 1978 to 40th in 2003—and about the prospects for 
future growth.
1   
Inadequacies in the institutional environment or in policy can bring 
slow growth.  The government can impede markets either by doing things it 
should not do or by failing to do things it should do.  For example, it might 
                                                             
1 The per capita income rank data are from Gould (1982, p. 21) and World Bank (2003).  For 
analyses of New Zealand’s long-term growth performance, see Hall (1996) and Kehoe and Ruhl 
(2003). 2 
obstruct entrepreneurship by setting onerous licensing rules for new firms.  On the 
other hand, an undersupply of financial-market regulation could make it hard for 
firms to grow.   
Historically, obtrusive government was the big issue in New Zealand.  
Controls hamstrung the economy (Tower, 1979; James, 1986; Evans et al., 1996; 
McMillan, 1998).  Adjectives like “inflexible” and “sclerotic” were commonly 
used to describe it.  “New Zealand was a more distorted and inflexible economy 
than most other countries that we compared ourselves with,” notes Geoff Lewis 
(2002, p. 5).  Overregulation having been addressed by the reforms of the 1980s, 
however, we should consider the possibility that, today, the government is 
neglecting to do some of what it should be doing.  
  Informational asymmetries—lemons-market problems and the like—
mean that markets, in order to work as they are supposed to, need structural 
underpinnings, some of which only the government can provide (McMillan, 
2002).   
One of the “key areas for action,” Prime Minister Helen Clark says, is 
“creating an environment in which small and medium sized companies can more 
easily become large companies” (Clark and Christie, 2002).  Economic growth is 
about “growing the individual businesses that comprise the economy,” the 
Treasury (2004, p. 70) notes, which requires an environment “where the 
incentives encourage enterprise and innovation, where firms seek out and develop 
profitable new opportunities, and where well performing and more productive 
firms will prosper, while poorer performers exit.”   
Why does the flexibility of the economy matter for productivity 
growth?  There are two ways to make an industry more productive:  raising the 
productivity of all of the firms in it, or holding each firm’s productivity constant 
but increasing the market share of the more productive firms (or creating new, 
more productive firms) while decreasing the share of the less productive.  If best 
practice readily diffused across firms, market shares would not need to change.  
To a surprising extent, however, such diffusion fails to occur.   3 
Empirical studies in the United States and elsewhere find interfirm 
productivity gaps to be wide and persistent (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000).  In any 
given industry, output per worker can be twice as high or more in the better-
performing firms than in the lesser ones.  The skills of a firm’s workforce, the size 
and age of its capital stock and the talents of its managers affect its productivity 
(though the existing econometric studies leave a large unexplained residual, so we 
do not have much understanding of why the productivity differences are so 
persistent).  The productivity laggards often continue as laggards for years.  It is 
because of these interfirm productivity gaps that the turnover of firms measurably 
contributes to industry productivity.  In the United States, about a half of a typical 
industry’s productivity growth is attributable to firm turnover (Caves, 1998, pp. 
1971-75; Haltiwanger, 2002).  
In an economy in which firm turnover is blocked, then, unblocking it 
could potentially double overall productivity growth.  The reallocation of 
resources from less productive activities to more productive ones via the rise and 
fall of firms is one of the main sources of any market economy’s dynamism.    
2  Quantifying Creative Destruction 
What do the data say?  Is economic growth being held back by 
obstacles to doing business?  A quick gauge of flexibility is the number of small 
firms.  New Zealand has more than 240,000 firms with five or fewer employees 
(MED, 2003, p. 5).  Entrepreneurship is abundant.  One out of nine adult New 
Zealanders runs one of these tiny businesses. 
Twelve further criteria will be used in what follows to measure the 
economy’s flexibility.  If policy-makers were to track changes over time in 
measures such as these, they could get a useful gauge of the economy’s health:   
•  turnover of wealth 
•  the accessibility of the business sector  
•  firms’ receptiveness to new technologies 
•  regulatory impediments to doing business   
•  the amount of job creation and job destruction  
•  gaps in the size distribution of firms  4 
•  the likelihood of growing from small to medium-sized 
•  the likelihood of downsizing 
•  the likelihood of becoming large 
•  competitive discipline on large firms 
•  hindrances to converting to share ownership 
•  changes in the list of the top ten corporations 
2.1 Turnover  of  wealth 
A measure of an economy’s receptiveness to enterprising individuals is 
the source of rich people’s wealth, inherited or self-earned.  How the rich got to be 
rich affects economic growth, according to Morck et al. (2000).  Adding up the 
wealth of various countries’ US-dollar billionaires, self-made and inherited, and 
correlating the totals with economic growth, they find that in countries where self-
made billionaire wealth is a larger fraction of GDP, economic growth is faster.  
This is unsurprising, being consistent with the notion of wealth as an incentive for 
productive effort.  More striking, they further find that in countries where 
inherited billionaire wealth is a larger fraction of GDP, economic growth is 
slower.  (They call this the “Canadian disease.”)  A preponderance of inherited 
wealth might result from education being unattainable for the poor, or from 
financial markets malfunctioning so as to exclude those who are not already 
established, or from firms staying family-run because the managerial labour 
market cannot cope with a transition from founder to professional manager.   
Whatever the reason, entrenching the rich and their offspring is bad for growth.   
Is the New Zealand business sector accessible to enterprising people 
regardless of their upbringing?  If we take the source of rich people’s wealth, 
inherited versus self-earned, as a measure of accessibility, New Zealand looks to 
be in good shape.  Using as the cutoff a net wealth of at least NZ$10 million, 
Hazledine and Siegfried (1997) calculate that 74 percent of New Zealand’s rich 
did not get their start in life from inherited wealth (or 63 percent if those in 
banking, brokerage, real estate, business services and personal services are 
excluded, leaving manufacturing, mining and construction).  This is a larger 
fraction of self-made rich people than in Australia, with 66 percent, Britain, with 
61 percent, or the United States, with 59 percent.  (A caveat:  a higher wealth 5 
cutoff is used for these other countries than for New Zealand, which could make 
such comparisons questionable). 
New Zealand’s rich tend to be self-made.  The belief that those from 
modest backgrounds can succeed by their own hard work, the creed of “strive and 
succeed” associated with the writer Horatio Alger, is central to the American self-
image.  It seems to be more a reality in New Zealand than in the United States. 
2.2  Accessibility of the business sector 
A caveat on the business sector’s openness to those not already 
established is that members of the various groups in society are not all equally 
likely to be entrepreneurs.  There are discrepancies by gender:  9.3 percent of 
males are classified as “employers” in the 2001 census, compared with 4.4 percent 
of females.  And there are discrepancies by race:  8.4 percent of Europeans are 
employers, compared with 7.4 percent of Asians, 3.1 percent of Māori and 1.6 
percent of Pacific Islanders (MED, 2003, pp. 25-26).  In other words, males are 
twice as likely to be employers as females, while Europeans are three times as 
likely to be employers as Māori and six times as likely as Pacific Islanders.    
These discrepancies could arise from any of a number of possible 
sources (Chapple, 2000; Te Puni Kōkiri, 2000; Gibson and Scobie, 2004).  Some 
are amenable to policy, such as disparities in education or in access to information 
networks.  Others are innocuous, such as differences in the number of people of 
working age relative to children and the elderly.  While equality of opportunity is 
usually discussed in terms of equity, it also has an efficiency aspect, for it can 
affect productivity.  Given the assumption that innate entrepreneurial talent is 
equally distributed across gender and across race, differences in the likelihood of 
being an employer could perhaps imply that the marginal female or Māori or 
Pacific Islander entrepreneur is more talented than the marginal white male 
entrepreneur (because the latter are further down the talent distribution:  on the 
theory of this link between equity and efficiency, see Loury (1981) and Bénabou 
(1996).)  If so, the nation’s stock of entrepreneurial talent may not be fully 
utilized, perhaps at some cost to overall productivity growth.     6 
However, the discrepancies in the stock of entrepreneurs are a holdover 
from the past and, in the case of Māori, may already be on the way to being 
eliminated, according to a recent survey of entrepreneurs.  In the early 2000s, 
more Māori, as a percentage of their working-age population, started new 
businesses than non-Māori (Fredericks, 2004, pp. 36-37).  Māori were creating 
firms at a faster rate than the overall firm-creation rate in Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  The male-female discrepancy persists, with 
fewer females than males starting new businesses in the early 2000s (Fredericks, 
2004, pp. 32-33).  Nevertheless, females in New Zealand were creating firms at a 
faster rate than females in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.   
While discrepancies exist, the business sector in New Zealand seems to 
be more accessible than in comparable countries to females and nonwhites. 
2.3 Firms’  receptiveness to new technologies 
Are New Zealand firms taking advantage of the opportunities offered 
by new technologies?  According to Paul Romer’s (1986) growth model, the key 
to sustainable economic growth is that firms are motivated to invest in new 
technologies.  Innovation raises productivity in any country, but it is especially 
important when the country is remote from its export markets and the 
technologies in question improve information processing and communication.   
Australia’s relatively fast 1990s growth is attributed by some to its 
ready adoption of the new information and communications technologies (Parham 
and Roberts, 2004).  As an explanation of the growth differential between 
Australia and New Zealand, however, this founders on the fact that New Zealand 
adopted those technologies just as rapidly.  Internet penetration—the fraction of 
the population who are users of the internet—is higher in New Zealand than 
Australia (Chinn and Fairlie, 2004).  The prices charged by internet server 
providers are lower in New Zealand, as are domain-name registration fees.  More 
web sites and domain names are registered in New Zealand, per capita, than in 
Australia (Boles de Boer, et al., 2000; Howell and Marriott, 2001).   
With online business-to-business exchanges having been set up in the 
1990s for export industries such as timber as well as online services running 7 
banking, procurement and transportation, New Zealand has been, according to 
Boles de Boer, et al. (2000, p. 9), “among the world leaders in uptake of electronic 
commerce.” 
2.4 Regulatory  obstacles 
In the view of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, business has 
continued to be obstructed, even since the reforms, by big government.  Wolfgang 
Kasper (2002a, p. 15; 2002b, p. 18) opines that New Zealanders are not “daring to 
be self-reliant and free” because “benevolent state paternalism” has created 
“unjustified barriers to entrepreneurial activity,” resulting in “poor growth and a 
stifling, though comforting serfdom.”  Bryce Wilkinson (2001a, p. 5) argues, 
“New Zealand suffers from avoidable and undesirable regulatory excesses.”   
Roger Kerr (2000) says the “quagmire of regulation” is a “massive deterrent to 
investment and economic growth.”   In some countries, to be sure, regulation has 
been shown to be very harmful.  Where the regulatory environment is 
unsupportive, enterprise is held back and productivity is low (Johnson et al., 2002; 
Klapper et al., 2004).  For New Zealand, what do the data say?  Is there any 
evidence that regulation is a “massive” deterrent to investment? 
The vast number of firms with five or fewer employees, already noted, 
suggests that the red tape for setting up a firm is inconsequential.  New Zealand’s 
regulatory costs of starting a business are among the world’s lowest, according to 
Djankov et al. (2002), who describe the procedures for registering a firm as 
“streamlined.”  It takes 3 days to begin operating legally in New Zealand, 
compared with 2 days in Australia, 4 days in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, 42 days in Germany and 53 days in France.  The data offer no reason 
for concern about regulatory barriers to entry in New Zealand. 
Ongoing businesses face costs of complying with regulations on 
taxation, worker relations, health and safety, labeling and certification, natural-
resource management and so on.  In a quarterly survey of small businesses run by 
the National Bank, regulation is usually the respondents’ most cited or second-
most cited complaint, with around 20 percent saying it is their biggest problem 
(National Bank, various dates).  Managers everywhere grumble about red tape, 8 
however, just as farmers grumble about the weather.  Some firms do suffer from 
high compliance costs.  From time to time, a newspaper publishes an article 
describing a manager being hounded by bureaucrats.  (Several such news reports 
are collected in Wilkinson (2001a); the Resource Management Act in particular 
gives rise to complaints.)  Anecdotal evidence is of limited use, though.  The 
firms that get written up in newspaper articles do not constitute a random sample.  
It is extreme cases that are newsworthy.  To judge whether the anecdotes of 
regulatory intrusion are typical or not, we need data.   
How big are regulatory compliance costs in New Zealand?  They are 
small, according to one survey of small firms (Alexander et al., 2004), averaging 
one hour per week of the manager’s time.  They are larger, according to another 
survey (KPMG, 2003), averaging five hours per week for firms with five or fewer 
employees and thirteen hours per week for firms with six to nine employees.   
Neither estimate is definitive—the Alexander et al. survey is more thorough but 
has a small sample, while the KPMG survey relies questionably on the 
respondents’ memories—so which is more accurate is an open question.  They 
suggest, however, that in the smallest firms complying with regulations typically 
takes up somewhere between 2 percent and 10 percent of the manager’s time.    
Compliance costs differ markedly from firm to firm in the survey data 
of Alexander et al. (2004), showing the unreliability of extrapolations from 
anecdotes about a few selected firms.  Does red tape discourage firms from 
growing?  As a firm’s workforce expands, according to the data of KPMG (2003), 
compliance costs rise less than proportionately.  Compliance costs fall most 
heavily on the smallest firms, therefore, suggesting that, if anything, they should 
serve as an incentive to expand.  While red tape might perhaps induce an early 
exit from some firms, it could push others to grow.    
Current or future policy changes could place new impediments in the 
way of entrepreneurs.  In 2004, Roderick Deane warned about a plethora of re-
regulation, which he said will bring “reduced flexibility and reduced adaptability 
for private sector firms” (O’Sullivan, 2004).  Fears of a reversion to 
overregulation should not be assessed by anecdotes, however.  The way to assess 
whether regulation is excessive is by systematically tracking the data. 9 
Red tape is less burdensome in New Zealand than in other countries.  A 
survey by the OECD finds compliance costs per employee to be 40 percent lower 
in New Zealand than Australia (OECD, 2001, p. 22), and a survey by the 
Auckland and New South Wales Chambers of Commerce finds them to be 16 
percent lower (Read, 2004).  A World Bank survey, quantifying the regulatory 
costs of starting a business, hiring and firing workers, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, enforcing contracts, and closing a business (World 
Bank, 2004), finds New Zealand’s business rules and regulations to be the least 
intrusive in the world.  
While some firms suffer higher compliance costs than others, the data 
indicate that regulation is not a heavy burden for the typical New Zealand firm.   
2.5  Job creation and destruction 
In the United States, about 10 percent of all jobs are destroyed each 
year.  Meanwhile, roughly as many are created anew (Davis et al., 1996; 
Haltiwanger, 2002).  Job creation slightly exceeds job destruction some years, and 
the reverse in other years, with job destruction showing more cyclical variation 
than job creation.  When you think about it, 10 percent of all jobs is an 
astonishingly big number.  In the European Union, turnover is high but not as high 
in the United States, with 6 percent of jobs being created and destroyed each year.  
The rate varies from country to country:  for example, in Germany it is 4 percent, 
in France, 5 percent, in the UK, 7 percent, and in Spain, 9 percent (Gómez-
Salvador et al., 2004).  More volatility is seen in small firms than in large, and 
more in services than in manufacturing.  
In New Zealand, jobs were created at a rate of 18 percent each year 
between 1995 and 2001 and jobs were destroyed at a rate of 15 percent (Carroll et 
al., 2002).  Another estimate, using data definitions more consistent with the 
European and United States studies, estimated the rate of job creation and 
destruction to be just under 12 percent (Mills and Timmins, 2004).  New 
Zealand’s job creation and destruction is somewhat more rapid than in the United 
States and considerably more rapid than in Europe.   10 
While the chief effect of job creation and destruction is to increase the 
economy’s productivity by reallocating labour and capital to more productive 
uses, there are some caveats.  More turnover is not necessarily better.   
An efficiency concern is that market frictions could cause job 
destruction to be excessive.  Because information does not flow perfectly freely in 
the labour market, job seekers and job vacancies coexist.  While the laid-off 
workers search for jobs, output and wages are lost.  Firms have no incentive to 
take these social costs into account when they make their lay-off decisions, and so 
too many workers might be laid off (Howitt and McAfee, 1987).  Also, if a firm is 
capital-constrained, as small firms often are, it may be unable to wait out a 
temporary drop in demand for its product, and so it lays off workers whom it 
would have kept had it been able to obtain a bank loan.   
A distributional concern is that the burden of adjustment is borne by the 
workers who, though no fault of their own, are thrown out of work when their 
firms shrink.  The severity of this burden is an empirical issue, depending on the 
duration of laid-off workers’ unemployment and the level of unemployment 
benefits.  Even those not laid off suffer uncertainty about whether they will keep 
their job.  However, the costs borne by the workers bear no simple relationship to 
the amount of job destruction, for across the economy the amount of job 
destruction is approximately equal to the amount of job creation (Davis et al., 
1996; Gómez-Salvador et al., 2004).     
Firm turnover, then, is simultaneously beneficial, in increasing 
productivity by shifting resources into their best uses, and harmful, in putting the 
burden of adjustment on the workers who lose their jobs.  The data do not allow 
us assess whether New Zealand is at the right point in this trade-off:  that is, 
whether the current amount of firm turnover is optimal.  They do, however, allow 
us to examine the claim that, as a result of business-unfriendly policies, there are 
is too little.  By comparison with other countries, New Zealand’s high job 
turnover suggests that the labour market is not overconstrained.  In its job creation 
and destruction, the New Zealand economy exhibits a lot of flexibility.  11 
2.6  Gaps in the size distribution of firms 
The firm-size distribution in many countries, especially developing 
economies, shows a missing middle.  There is a lot of employment in tiny firms 
and quite a lot in large firms but not much in mid-sized firms (Snodgrass and 
Biggs, 1996).  The missing middle is a symptom of weak legal and regulatory 
institutions.  Small firms can survive in an institution-free environment, by using 
personal networks and ongoing relationships to substitute for missing laws of 
contract and retained earnings and personal savings to make up for a lack of 
access to financial markets (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).  Large firms also can 
prosper without institutions, getting by instead by cultivating political favours.  
They got to be big in the first place, usually, through knowing the right people.  
Where the lack of institutions shows up is for small firms wishing to grow.   
Needing to make discrete investments, they can no longer rely on retained 
earnings, and may be unable to grow if the financial market is underdeveloped.  A 
symptom of inadequate institutions, therefore, is relatively few mid-sized firms.  
Even in industrialized countries, small firms get much of their finance 
from retained earnings and trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  There is a 
“pecking order,” in which a firm exhausts its internal funds before it seeks 
external funds.  An informational asymmetry—the entrepreneur knows the firm’s 
prospects better than a bank does—puts a wedge between the value of internal 
funds and the cost of external funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  If information 
sources are lacking and investment uncertainties are prevalent, banks may be 
reluctant to lend to small firms, preventing them from growing to medium size. 
Is there a missing middle in the size distribution of New Zealand firms?  
The data say there is not.  Table 1 shows the percentage of total private-sector 
employment by firm size (measuring firm size by number of employees).  New 
Zealand has proportionately as much employment in firms with 20 to 99 
employees as Australia and more than the United Kingdom and the United States.  
To judge by the distribution of firm sizes, New Zealand’s firms do not seem to be 
hampered from growing from small to mid-sized. 12 
Table 1:  The Firm-Size Distribution 
 
Employment by firm size, as a percentage of total private-sector employment 
 
      Firm size (number of employees) 
   0  –  19   20  –  99   >  100 
New Zealand      42%       19%     39% 
Australia      47%       19%      34% 
United Kingdom    30%       12%      58% 
United States      28%       16%      56% 
 
 Source: MED (2003, p. 27). 
 
2.7  Barriers to growing from small to medium-sized 
Another way of asking whether firms that show initial success face 
undue barriers to growth is to compute the likelihood of transitioning from small 
to larger (using data in MED, 2003, pp. 5, 17-18).  Among firms that had 5 or 
fewer employees in 1995, 6 percent had grown by 2002 to have 6 to 9 employees 
and another 2 percent to have 10 to 19, and another 0.5 percent to have more than 
20.  By a back-of-the-envelope calculation, the firms that in grew, in the seven 
years, from less than six employees to six or more created more than 150,000 new 
jobs.  
Among firms that had 6 to 9 employees in 1995, 21 percent had grown 
by 2002 to have more than 9 employees and another 3 percent to have more than 
20.  Among firms with 10 to 19 employees in 1995, 19 percent had grown by 
2002 to have 20 to 49 employees and another 2 percent to have 50 or more.  
Among firms with 20 to 49 employees in 1995, 12 percent had grown by 2002 to 
have 50 or more employees.  On the face of it these numbers do not look low.   
The average New Zealand firm still in business four years after its birth 
has 22 percent more employees than when it started, according to Mills and 
Timmins (2004).  In the United States, firms show much faster growth, with the 
average surviving new firm doubling its employment in four years.  However, 
new firms grow unusually quickly in the United States, and the New Zealand 13 
growth rates are similar to those in the United Kingdom and other OECD 
countries.   
New Zealand has a relatively high-rate of self-employment (Mills and 
Timmins, 2004).  In some countries, a large number of single-person firms is a 
bad sign, for it is a symptom of impediments to firm growth (Snodgrass and 
Biggs, 1996).  However, in the case of New Zealand, given the evidence that 
firms are able to grow, the prevalence of self-employment need not be a concern.   
Promising small firms, it would appear, are able to attract the capital 
and other resources they need in order to grow to medium-sized.  
2.8 Barriers  to  downsizing 
The flip side of the ability of successful firms to expand is the ability of 
unsuccessful firms to shrink, freeing their labour and capital for other uses.  The 
data on firm transitions (MED, 2003, pp. 17-18) show downward as well as 
upward flexibility.  Among firms with 10 to 19 employees in 1995, 30 percent had 
shrunk to less than 10 employees by 2002.  Among firms with 20 to 49 employees 
in 1995, 28 percent had shrunk to less than 20 employees by 2002.  Among firms 
with 50 to 99 employees in 1995, 29 percent had shrunk to less than 50 employees 
by 2002.  Among firms with more than 100 employees in 1995, 14 percent had 
shrunk to 20 to 99 employees, and another 9 percent to less than 20 employees.   
The market winnows out the weaker firms ruthlessly.  In New Zealand, 
by 2 years after founding, 23 percent of new firms have exited; after 4 years, 52 
percent have exited (Mills and Timmins, 2004, p. 19).  In other words, a startup 
firm has a mere 50-50 chance of surviving beyond four years.  Fast as this attrition 
may appear, it is comparable to, and actually somewhat slower than, in the United 
States and in the OECD overall.    
These data do not allow us to judge whether the current amount of 
downsizing is optimal, but they do at least suggest that there is no major barrier to 
downsizing. 14 
2.9 Barriers  to  becoming  large 
Are there impediments to medium-sized firms becoming large?  More 
than simply getting bigger, turning into a large firm entails metamorphosis.  The 
organization becomes inherently more complex.  A large firm is qualitatively 
different from a small or medium-sized firm.  Instead of being owned by an 
individual or a partnership, it (usually) has share ownership.  Instead of all 
decisions being made by the owner-manager, decision-making is delegated down 
a managerial hierarchy.  Trust becomes needed.  The owners must trust the top 
manager to pursue their interests, and the top manager must trust middle managers 
to make the right decisions.  Finding good managers requires an effective 
managerial labour market.  Sustaining an efficient level of trade in stocks requires 
financial markets to have attained a degree of sophistication.   
The data on firm transitions suggest New Zealand firms face no 
blockage to getting beyond 100 employees.  Among firms with 20 to 49 
employees in 1995, 2 percent had grown by 2002 to over 100, and among firms 
with 50 to 99 employees, 22 percent had grown to over 100 (MED, 2003, p. 18).  
Each year about 70 firms, employing about 1 percent of the total workforce, grew 
from less than 100 employees to more than 100. 
While there seems to be no barrier to passing the 100-employee mark, 
conceivably there is a glass ceiling to firm growth at some higher number of 
employees.  (100 employees is a low cutoff for “large.”)  Small and medium-sized 
firms have been the focus of much of the policy analysis up to now.  (Note for 
example the NZ Treasury’s report (2004, p. 71), which discusses the financial 
market only as it affects small firms.)  The evidence on firm transitions cited 
above suggests, however, that the small-and-medium sector is in fact in 
reasonably good shape.  Perhaps it is time to focus the policy analysis on New 
Zealand’s largest firms.  Most of the data collection up to now has examined small 
and medium firms (for example, MED, 2003), so collecting more data on large 
firms could be useful.  The question of whether large firms face institutional or 
policy impediments to growth and efficient operation warrants further empirical 
research.   15 
2.10  Competitive discipline on large firms 
“The best of all monopoly profits,” remarked John Hicks, “is a quiet 
life.”  Large firms, facing weaker market disciplines than smaller firms, may lack 
the incentive to seek out new, more efficient ways of running themselves.  How 
productive are New Zealand’s large firms?  After reviewing the available 
evidence on the largest firms, Simmons (2004) concludes that they have been 
performing poorly, measured by value added or return on assets; he calls this poor 
performance a “mystery.”
2  In their ability to create shareholder value, according 
to Healy (2000), the largest firms have been “hugely disappointing,” which he 
attributes to agency costs and “a lack of focus on managing shareholder wealth on 
the part of management.”   
One possible reason for large-firm underperformance is a shortage of 
managerial talent.  However, this might be just a temporary shortage.  The skills 
asked of a top manager in the pre-1984 protectionist economy were distinct from 
those needed in a competitive global marketplace.  In the old economy, success 
came from negotiating favours from the government.  Understanding how to 
compete was not the issue, for the government sheltered its chosen firms from the 
inconveniences of competition.  As described (with a little hyperbole) by Alan 
Gibbs, who ran companies during that era, “Every area of our economy was 
licensed and if you had a licence you were protected and no one could break into 
your market” (Russell, 1996, p.12).  Nowadays, managers must know how to plot 
competitive strategies.  It could take a decade or two for the new breed of 
manager to develop expertise and rise to the top, and this could perhaps explain a 
slow reform response of large firms. 
A second possible reason for large-firm underperformance is 
geography.  “The death of distance,” remark Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), 
“is exaggerated.”  Despite the internet, the transaction costs of trading 
internationally remain sizeable.  Firms might be unable to attain scale economies 
because New Zealand’s market is limited and foreign markets are far away 
(Skilling, 2001).   
                                                             
2 The view that these firms are underperforming is, however, questioned on methodological 
grounds by Wilkinson (2001b). 16 
A firm may be condemned to producing below minimum efficient scale 
unless it exports to some larger markets, and there may be barriers to moving into 
exporting.  The direct costs of exporting—transport costs and tariff and nontariff 
barriers—are roughly proportional to the quantities traded, but there is a fixed-
cost component to other trade costs, like language barriers, different currencies, 
contracting insecurities, and learning about foreign demands and how to do 
business overseas.  The internet may have reduced trade costs but it has not 
eliminated them.  Trade costs are especially high for differentiated goods with 
scale economies (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).  Most New Zealand firms 
do not export.  Among with an annual turnover of at least $30,000, just 4 percent 
are exporters, and just 10 percent of those exporters account for 95 percent of 
exports (Simmons, 2004).  The transaction costs of selling overseas could inhibit 
firms from exporting and thus from growing to an efficient scale.   
Within the domestic market, conversely, in an industry with substantial 
trade costs the local firms may face little competition from overseas producers.  If 
the industry has scale economies, there may be room for only a few local 
producers.  Lacking competitive discipline, the firms in such an industry may 
have little incentive to improve their productivity.  (Even if the relevant market is 
Australia plus New Zealand, the same point applies.  A market of 24 million 
people is not large relative to the minimum efficient scale of some industries.) 
A third possible reason for the large firms’ poor performance, to be 
considered next, is frictions in the financial market.  
2.11 Financial-market  frictions 
For shareholders, evaluating the managers’ decisions is not easy, for 
they lack information about the firm’s affairs.  The informational asymmetries can 
cause lemons-market problems to arise (Ausubel, 1990; McMillan, 2002, Ch. 13).  
In many countries, lax financial-market oversights allow controlling shareholders 
to expropriate minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000).  If the rules governing 
the financial markets are inadequate, shareholders’ property rights are 
unprotected, so investment is deterred and firms may be hindered from getting the 
finance they need to grow.   17 
Countries that have effective financial markets rely on the oversight not 
only of the courts but also of a regulator.  Even Alan Greenspan, by the way, now 
concedes this.  In 1966, as a disciple of Ayn Rand, he believed regulation was 
uncalled for because “it is in the self-interest of every businessman to have a 
reputation for honest dealings.”  Thus “the only protection required is that of 
criminal law” (Greenspan, 1966).  In 2002, after the scandals of Enron, 
WorldCom and the rest, he changed his mind, saying, “Our most recent 
experiences clearly indicate ... that adjustments to the existing structure of 
regulation ... are needed.”  A regulatory agency supplements the courts because it 
offers “rule-making flexibility” (Greenspan, 2002).   
In New Zealand, according to Minister of Commerce Paul Swain, 
“securities laws do not work as effectively as they should. Our insider trading 
laws are lax and the institutions regulating the market do not have adequate power 
to ensure the laws are effectively implemented” (Swain, 2002).  Are there gaps in 
New Zealand’s financial-market regulation?  The evidence is mixed. 
In a comparison of investor protections across the industrialized 
countries, La Porta et al. (2002) calculate, as a rough proxy for investor 
protections, an “index of antidirector rights,” reflecting the ease with which 
shareholders can vote for directors as well as the existence of grievance 
mechanisms for shareholders.  This index (with a higher number representing 
stronger protections) scores the United States and the United Kingdom 5, 
Australia 4, France 3 and Germany 1.  New Zealand’s score is 4.  An OECD study 
of financial systems (Leahy et al., 2001) compiles a summary measure of investor 
protections, reflecting the effectiveness of disclosure rules and enforcement as 
well as shareholder and creditor rights.  With a higher number meaning stronger 
protections, the United Kingdom scores 0.86, Australia 0.60, the United States 
0.42, Germany 0.23 and France -0.61.  New Zealand’s score is 0.66.  By these 
measures, in the 1990s New Zealand was protecting its investors as stringently as 
other industrialized countries. 
On the other hand, some measures suggest that all is not well in the 
financial market.  One is the ownership of large firms.  New Zealand’s companies 
tend not to be widely held.  Looking at the 20 largest publicly traded firms in 18 
industrialized countries, and defining “widely held” to mean no single shareholder 
has more than 20 percent of the voting rights, La Porta et al (1999, p. 492) 
calculate that in the United Kingdom 100 percent of the largest companies are 
widely held, in the United States 80 percent, in Australia 65 percent, in France 60 
percent and in Germany 50 percent.  In New Zealand, by contrast, just 30 percent 
of the largest companies are widely held.  Examining family ownership, again 
using the 20 percent cutoff for control, they find that in the United Kingdom none 
of the 20 largest companies is family controlled, in Australia 5 percent, in 
Germany 10 percent, in France 20 percent and in the United States 20 percent.  In 
New Zealand, 25 percent of the 20 largest companies are family controlled.     
A further indication that trade in stocks is not as active as it might be is 
in stock-market capitalization.  The total capitalization of the New Zealand 
Exchange is about US$45 billion, less than that of many individual corporations 
overseas.  (For comparison, the New York Stock Exchange’s tenth-largest 
company, Procter and Gamble, has a market capitalization of about $130 billion.)  
In 2002, according to the World Federation of Exchanges, market capitalization in 
New Zealand was 32 percent of GDP.  While this is similar to Germany and 
France, it is far lower than in Australia, 92 percent, the United States, 105 percent, 
or the United Kingdom, 111 percent.
3  Relative to the economy, the UK, US and 
Australian stock markets are three times as large as New Zealand’s.    
Further research is warranted on firms’ propensity not to convert 
themselves to share ownership and, among those that do convert, to have 
concentrated ownership. 
2.12  Changes in the top ten corporations 
Turnover in the list of a country’s largest corporations is related to 
economic performance, according to data in He et al. (2003).  With initial per 
capita GDP, education level and capital stock held constant, economic growth is 
faster in countries with more turnover on the top-ten list.   
                                                             
3 http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/INDICATOR503.pdf 19 
Greater instability among the largest corporations is associated with 
faster productivity growth and more investment.  The economy performs well 
where new firms able to rise to the top; it performs badly where established firms 
are entrenched.  The causality could go either way.  Fast-growing firms could 
drive economic growth; or the inability of new firms to rise to challenge the 
established corporations might be a symptom of deeper market rigidities.   
Turnover matters for growth, then, at the level of not only the smallest firms but 
also of the largest. 
Are there barriers to reaching the top of the New Zealand corporate 
sector?  One piece of evidence suggests not.  In New Zealand, just three of the ten 
largest companies (by employment) in 1975 were still in the top ten in 1996.  For 
comparison, two companies stayed in the top ten from 1975 to 1996 in the United 
Kingdom, four in France, five in the United States and Australia and seven in 
Germany (He et al., 2003).  A caveat:  this period includes the deep deregulation 
and privatization of the 1980s, so these data may overstate the current amount of 
fluidity.  Nevertheless, New Zealand has seen considerable turnover at the heights 
of the corporate world.     
3  Markets Are Doing Their Job  
New Zealand has plenty of creative destruction.  Contrary to the 
perception of an economy held back by business-unfriendly policies, the data 
show that enterprise is flourishing.  One in nine adult New Zealanders runs a firm 
with five or fewer employees.  Barriers to entry being low, new firms start up at a 
rapid clip.  Entrepreneurs are able to succeed by their own efforts, without having 
to rely on inherited wealth.  In each year, many firms disappear and many grow.  
There seem to be no major barriers to growth or shrinkage, so those firms that are 
revealed to have poor prospects shrink or shut down, while those that have a 
marketable product and are well managed expand.  For large firms the evidence is 
less clearcut, and further empirical research is needed on their apparently limp 
performance.  (Is it the financial market?  The managerial labour market?  A 
product market too small for efficient production?)  The list of the largest firms 20 
does, at least, show flux.  One of the most fundamental of all market processes, 
the ebb and flow of firms in New Zealand seems to be unrestrained.   
The conclusion that barriers to entrepreneurship are inconsequential 
leaves unexplained the low aggregate investment of the 1990s and the continuing 
income gap between New Zealand and Australia (and other OECD countries).  If 
an inflexible economy is not the culprit, what else could it be?   
Perhaps it is geography.  New Zealand’s remoteness and the small size 
of the domestic market, by affecting technology diffusion and trade flows, might 
cause growth to be slow (Skilling, 2001).  Also, large firms in concentrated 
sectors might lack competitive pressure to seek out ways of improving their 
productivity.  Distance and smallness clearly are disadvantages.  However, 
geography would not seem to be destiny, for Australia, with GDP a quarter of 
California’s, is a small economy too.   
Another possibility is lags in adjustment.  The disappointing 
productivity growth before the 1980s was doubtless caused, at least in part, by the 
overregulation which, starting in the 1930s, reached its peak in the 1970s.  The 
slow growth of the 1990s might perhaps have been nothing worse than a delayed 
response to the reforms of the mid 1980s to early 1990s.  Why was the reform 
response so slow?   
Major adjustments were called for, the preexisting economy-wide 
distortions being extreme:  wider and deeper than in most other industrialized 
nations.  It took time for the new policies to be implemented, and additional time 
for firms and workers to retune their behaviour.   
Systemic effects may have further slowed the reform response 
(McMillan, 2004).  Reforms complement each other, in that any one is more 
effective if others are already in place.  (For example, trade opening is 
complemented by labour-market reforms.  Taking advantage of trade reform 
entails shrinking some industries and expanding others, which requires that the 
labour markets—including the managerial labour market—be flexible.)  The 
magnitude of the policy interlinkages, and even in some cases their existence, is 
hard to foresee.  Each separate reform may be useless until its complementary 21 
reforms have had time to take hold.  The interactions among the reforms could 
mean that gains would take a decade or so to show.  Given the diagnosis that the 
malady is transitory, no major change in policy is prescribed.  
As the saying goes, “If it aint broke, don’t fix it.”  Perhaps the 
productivity upturn of the late 1990s and early 2000s, observed by Black et al. 
(2003), Buckle et al. (2004) and Razzak (2003), is sustainable over the longer 
term (though it is too early to conclude this for sure).  Although for the largest 
firms there is a question mark, for small and medium-sized firms the current 
evidence on firm turnover, to my reading, calls for neither more government 
action nor less.  Harm could be done if policy was changed to address a 
nonexistent problem.  By and large, New Zealand’s labour and financial markets 
are doing their job.   
Sluggish productivity growth in New Zealand has persisted for decades 
(Hall, 1996; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2003).  Perhaps it is finally a thing of the past.  22 
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